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THE PRECARIOUS ROLE OF THE COURTS: SURROGATE
HEALTH CARE DECISIONMAKING
JOHN F. FADER II*
INTRODUCTION
The Maryland Health Care Decisions Act of 19931 should de-
crease the amount of court involvement in health care decisionmak-
ing. However, even though the Maryland Legislature has created a
broad, workable, and practical structure to facilitate health care deci-
sionmaking, disputes will continue to occur. No decision is more im-
portant to most individuals than one that affects their right to
autonomy in medical decisionmaking, particularly when the decision
involves the ultimate issue of whether they live or die. Hopefully and
expectedly, most of these disputes will be resolved without court inter-
vention. Virtually every court that has considered the subject of
health care decisionmaking has commented that courts should not be
involved in these decisions unless absolutely necessary.2
Both in Maryland and throughout the country, most life and
death decisions are made, as they should be, by the patient and/or his
loved ones following consultation with family, physicians, and clergy.
This is so even though most individuals have not made advance medi-
cal directives.' It is likely, however, that litigation will arise when there
is a dispute concerning whether a specific individual was competent to
* Judge, Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
1. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 to -618 (1994).
2. For example, in In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (NJ. 1987), the court stated: "Courts
are not the proper place to resolve the agonizing personal problems that underlie these
cases. Our legal system cannot replace the more intimate struggle that must be borne by
the patient, those caring for the patient, and those who care about the patient." Cf In re
Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 456 (Wash. 1987); In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Wash. 1984).
3. In In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 67-68 (Wis. 1992), the court commented that
"[r]elatively few individuals provide explicit written or oral instructions concerning their
treatment preferences should they become incompetent." The L. W. court noted that in a
1982 poll only 36% of those surveyed had given instructions regarding how they would like
to be treated if they ever became too sick to make decisions, and only 23% had put those
instructions in writing. Id. at 68 n.8 (citing 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 241-42 (1982)). In another poll, 56% of those surveyed had told
family members of their wishes concerning the use of life-sustaining treatment if they en-
tered an irreversible coma, but only 15% had filled out a living will specifying those wishes.
Id. (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION SURVEYS OF PHYSiCIAs AND PUBLIC OPINION ON
HEALTH CARE ISSUES 29-30 (1988)); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 289 n.1 (1990) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (citing the same surveys).
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make a medical directive. Courts also will be called upon to interpret
both written and verbal directives. At times, it will be necessary for
courts to attempt to ascertain the wishes of an incompetent patient or
to determine what steps are in a patient's best interest. There will be
other disputes. The potential for statutory and constitutional chal-
lenges in "furtherance" of the interests of a patient (or of society)-
depending upon the individuals and issues involved-is as open-
ended as the initiative of the human mind.
The legal framework with which individual health care decision-
making occurs will continue to be influenced by advances in medical
science. Tomorrow's scientific achievements will add clarity in some
situations and will create problems in others. As always, courts will be
called upon to adjudicate controversies and to resolve disputes, in-
cluding those that involve issues on the cutting edge of life. More-
over, courts will continue to be thrust into health care decisionmaking
disputes by virtue of their important and historic role as the ultimate
guardian of the person.
This Article attempts to delineate the areas of court involvement
in health care decisionmaking, both in the role of guardian and in the
role of settler of disputes. It examines relevant case law and the statu-
tory framework provided by Maryland's Health Care Decisions Act of
1993 and seeks to pinpoint areas of concern.
I. THE COURT'S ROLE AS GUARDIAN
A. The Court's General Power to Act as Guardian
Unlike some other states, Maryland has no "public" guardian as
such. Any role of public guardian usually is played by the Office on
Aging4 or the Department of Social Services.5 Courts, however, often
play a significant role as well. For some time the circuit court, Mary-
land's trial court of general jurisdiction,' has had the authority to ap-
point a guardian" for a disabled person, or for a minor, either for the
4. The Office on Aging is part of the Executive Department of Maryland Government.
It operates at both the state and local government levels. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 70B
(1988).
5. MD. CODE ANN., Ftm. LAW §§ 14-101 to -404 (1991) contains the provisions dealing
with the Adult Protective Services offered by the Department of Social Services.
6. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 1-501 (1989).
7. In their article, Statutory Reform in the Administration of Estates of Maryland Decedents,
Minors and Incompetents, 29 MD. L. REV. 85 (1969), Shale D. Stiller and Roger D. Redden
referred to the term "guardian" as a generic term. They wrote that the term "guardian" is
"used to describe anyone appointed by a court to manage the property of a minor or
'disabled person.' It will replace terms such as 'committee,' which always had an unpleas-
ant connotation, and 'conservator.'" Id. at 117-18.
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limited purpose of making one or more decisions related to that per-
son's health care or to act generally.8 Moreover, even if the court
appoints a guardian, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has stated that
the circuit court itself, as a court of equity, remains the actual guard-
ian of the ward:
Lest sight be lost of the fact, we remind all concerned
that a court of equity assumes jurisdiction in guardianship
matters to protect those who, because of illness or other disa-
bility, are unable to care for themselves. In reality the court
is the guardian; an individual who is given that title is merely
an agent or arm of that tribunal in carrying out its sacred
responsibility.9
Thus it is clear that the circuit court, in the exercise of its equity pow-
ers, has authority over the affairs of a disabled individual. The court is
bound to exercise that authority in accord with the laws of Maryland
and in particular with the directives of the legislature pertaining to
guardians.10
8. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708 (a) (1)&(2) (Supp. 1993). The statute cau-
tions, however, that "only those powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated need of
the disabled person" are to be granted to the guardian. Id.
9. Kicherer v. Kicherer, 285 Md. 114, 118, 400 A.2d 1097, 1100 (1979). The Kicherer
case involved a "volcanic" family feud of bickering between coguardians, which led the
court to direct that the chancellor take immediate steps to put an end to the manner in
which the coguardians were performing their duties. Id. at 115, 119, 500 A.2d at 1101.
10. In Bliss v. Bliss, 133 Md. 61, 72, 104 A. 467, 471 (1918), the court quoted with
approval a statement by ChiefJustice Daly of New York in The Marsee Merchant's Case, 11
Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 209 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1871) (also reported sub nom. In re Colah, 3 Daly 529):
The jurisdiction assumed to be inherent in a State over that unfortunate class of
persons within its limits, who are deprived of the use of their mental facilities,
may be said to rest upon two grounds-First: Its duty to protect the community
from the acts of those who are not under the guidance of reason, and secondly,
its duty to protect them, as a class incapable of protecting themselves, which has
its foundation in the reciprocal obligations of allegiance and protection, which
extends to aliens and strangers who, while they are within the limits of a State, are
under the obligations of a temporary and local allegiance, and are entitled to its
protection.
Id. at 72. Furthermore, in Matter of Eason, Incompetent, 214 Md. 176, 133 A.2d 441
(1957), commenting on the actions of the Maryland legislature, the Court of Appeals
observed:
Indeed, the custody of the person and property of those non compos mentis has
been so generally recognized and accepted as a legislative responsibility, both in
this country and in England, that it is not susceptible to serious challenge. In this
country, this responsibility is subject, of course, to constitutional limitations.
Id. at 183, 133 A.2d at 445.
Tracing the common law origins of such state jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals found
that upon ajury determination that an individual was non compos mentis, an English court of
chancery obtained jurisdiction over that individual's person and estate. Hamilton v.
Traber, 78 Md. 26, 29 (1893). The authority under which such an inquisition was con-
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Over the past twenty-five years, the legislature generally has ex-
panded the powers of guardians. For example, in 1969 the legislature
reformed the law governing decedents' estates and the conservation
and administration of property belonging to minors, incompetents,
and other legally disabled persons. The purpose of the 1969 revisions
was to simplify and standardize the guardianship laws and to acknowl-
edge the legal reality that thousands of trusts, both inter vivos and tes-
tamentary, already were operating without court involvement. In its
introduction to the statutory revisions, the legislature recognized that
the then-existing laws relating to guardians were enacted in the eight-
eenth century, an era of different legal realities."
Although the legislature has gradually expanded the types of ac-
tivities that guardians can perform without specific court authoriza-
12tion, some actions by guardians still require court approval. For
example, in addition to the general limitation in the Estates and
Trusts Article that "only those powers necessary to provide for the
demonstrated need of the disabled person are to be given to the
guardian,""5 prior to October 1, 1993, the law required that when a
medical procedure involved a substantial risk to the life of a disabled
person, the guardian had to seek specific authorization from the court
before taking any action.' 4 There were no exceptions to this rule.
ducted derived from the King's executive power as parens patriae, by means of an official
instrument called the "sign manual," which was signed by the King himself, sealed with his
privy seal, and executed by the Chancellor alone (not by the Court of Chancery). Id. at 29-
30. After such jurisdiction was obtained and a committee of person and property was ap-
pointed, the Court of Chancery then obtained jurisdiction to supervise and control the
official conduct of the committee. Id. at 31.
In Maryland, the statutory authority of the state to regulate certain aspects of the es-
tates of a ward can be traced back to 1773. Id. at 32. Moreover, in Bliss, the Court of
Appeals cited to the original grant of statutory authority to courts to decide guardianship
cases:
Section 114 of Article 16 of the Code (which was originally enacted by the Act of
1785, Ch. 72, sec. 6), provides: "The Court (court of equity) shall have full power
and authority, in all cases, to superintend and direct the affairs of persons non
compos mentis, both as to the care of their person and the management of their
estates, and may appoint a committee, or a trustee or trustees for such persons,
and may make such orders and decrees respecting their persons and estates as to
the Court may seem proper."
Bliss v. Bliss, 133 Md. 61, 71, 104 A. 467, 471 (1918).
11. See Stiller & Redden, supra note 7, at 117 n.159.
12. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708 (1991) (permitting the court to vest in
a guardian the authority to, inter alia, establish and change places of abode; provide care,
education and training; and to bring actions to compel support to be paid for the ward.)
13. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(a) (1) (Supp. 1993).
14. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c)(1) (1991).
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B. The 1993 Amendments to the Estates and Trusts Article: Expansion of
the Court's Power to Delegate Guardianship Decisions
By amending the Estates and Trusts Article-as part of the
Health Care Decisions Act of 1993-the legislature now has provided
that a court may grant a guardian the right to act without further
court authorization in some circumstances, even when a substantial
risk to the life of the ward is involved. 5 This authorization, however,
is limited to (a) when the disabled person failed to appoint a health
care agent, but executed an advance medical directive authorizing the
guardian to consent to a medical procedure that involves a substantial
risk of death;1 6 or (b) when the guardian is also the disabled person's
spouse, adult child, parent, or adult brother or sister.' 7
15. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c) (2) (Supp. 1993).
16. Id. § 13-708(c) (2) (i).
17. Id. § 13-708(c)(2)(ii). The Estates and Trusts Article prioritizes the individuals
who may be appointed as guardian of the person:
(a) Priorities.-Persons are entitled to appointment as guardian of the person ac-
cording to the following priorities:
(1) A person, agency, or corporation nominated by the disabled person if he
was 16 years old or older when he signed the designation and, in the opinion of
the court, he had sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice at the
time he executed the designation;
(2) A health care agent appointed by the disabled person in accordance with
Title 5, Subtitle 6 of the Health-General Article;
(3) His spouse;
(4) His parents;
(5) A person, agency, or corporation nominated by the will of a deceased
parent;
(6) His children;
(7) Adult persons who would be his heirs if he were dead;
(8) A person, agency, or corporation nominated by a person caring for him;
(9) Any other person, agency, or corporation considered appropriate by the
court;
(10) For adults less than 65 years old, the director of the local department of
social services or, for adults 65 years old or older, the director of the State Office
on Aging or local office on aging, except in those cases where the department of
social services has been appointed guardian of the person prior to age 65.
Id. § 13-707(a).
In Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993), the Court of Appeals noted that
the appointment of a guardian rests solely in the discretion of the equity court and that a
statutory preference in the appointment of a guardian, although seemingly mandatory and
absolute, is always subject to the overriding concern of the best interest of the ward. Id. at
203, 618 A.2d at 752. The case was sent back to the trial court because that court was said
to have merged the issue of whether sustenance could be withdrawn from the disabled
person with the issue of who should be guardian. The Court of Appeals found that the
trial court had improperly passed over the ward's wife, in favor of his father, who was
entitled to a lesser statutory priority in appointment as guardian. I. at 204, 206, 618 A.2d
at 752-53.
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These recent changes in the court's guardianship powers not
only preserve the equity court's historic prerogative and responsibility
to care for its wards, but also bring the guardianship laws into concert
with the legislature's strong policy pronouncements in favor of per-
sonal autonomy, as found in the Health Care Decisions Act of 1993.18
Indeed, the recent statutory changes to the guardianship laws firmly
support the legislature's mandate that whenever possible an individ-
ual patient should have the right to make his or her own medical care
decisions and to create a binding advance medical directive memorial-
izing these decisions, especially concerning whether and when to pro-
vide, withhold, or withdraw life-sustaining measures. An individual
now can rely on the advance medical directive being followed should
he or she become incapable of voicing a decision. In such a case, the
trial court can be expected to grant a guardian the power to act with-
out further court approval. Under the recent statutory changes,
moreover, even when the patient has not made an advance medical
directive, the court still may permit the decision to rest with a surro-
gate decisionmaker who is a member of the patient's family.9
In all other cases-when a statutorily-qualified individual is not
available to serve as guardian and when the patient has not prepared
an advance medical directive-the appointed guardian must obtain
specific court authorization before consenting to the withholding or
18. For example, under the Act, the decision to approve, withdraw, or withhold life
sustaining measures is to be made in accord with the following priorities: first, by following
the expressed desires of a competent individual in a written (or oral) advance directive or
in the appointment of a health care agent; second, by surrogate decisionmaking based on
the known wishes of a patient; and lastly, if the wishes of the patient are unknown, by
making a decision based on the best interest of the patient. See infra notes 37-52 and ac-
companying text.
19. It is important to note that the Estates & Trusts Article provides that courts "may,"
but are not required to, authorize guardians to make decisions regarding medical proce-
dures without specific court authorization:
(c) Medical procedures.-
(2) The court may, upon such conditions as the court considers appropriate,
authorize a guardian to make a decision regarding medical procedures that in-
volve a substantial risk to life without further court authorization, if:
(i) The disabled person has executed an advance directive in accord-
ance with Title 5, Subtitle 6 of the Health-General Article that authorizes the
guardian to consent to the provision, withholding or withdraw of a medical proce-
dure that involves a substantial risk to life but does not appoint a health care
agent; or
(ii) The guardian is also the disable person's spouse, adult child, parent,
or adult brother or sister.
MD. CODE ANN., Esr. & TRUSTS § 13-708(c) (Supp. 1993). The court still can refuse to
grant such power to the guardian, and thereby continue to exercise its own power as
guardian in the matter.
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withdrawal of a life-sustaining medical procedure. That court ap-
proval is the same "equity" oversight that has been required for hun-
dreds of years under English and American common law.
The 1993 revisions to the Estates & Trusts Article permit courts to
authorize guardians to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
procedures on two grounds. First, the guardian may make a treat-
ment decision on the basis of "substituted judgment," which is defined
in the Act as the decision that the disabled person would have made
if competent.2" Second, the guardian may base the decision on his or
20. Id. § 13-712(a). "Substituted judgment" is defined by § 13-711(d) to take into ac-
count any information that may be relevant to the decision, including:
(1) The current diagnosis, prognosis with and without the life-sustaining pro-
cedure, and life expectancy of the disabled person;
(2) Any expressed preferences of the disabled person regarding the provi-
sion of, or the withholding or withdrawal of, the life-sustaining procedure at issue;
(3) Any expressed preferences of the disabled person about the provision of,
or the withholding or withdrawal of, life-sustaining procedures generally,
(4) Any religious or moral beliefs or personal values of the disabled person
in relation to the provision of, or the withholding or withdrawal of, the life-sus-
taining procedure;
(5) Any behavioral or other manifestations of the attitude of the disabled
person toward the provision of, or the withholding or withdrawal of, life sus-
taining procedures;
(6) Any consistent pattern of conduct by the disabled person regarding prior
decisions about health care;
(7) Any reactions of the disabled person to the provision of, or the withhold-
ing or withdrawal of, a comparable life-sustaining procedure for another individ-
ual; and
(8) Any expressed concerns of the disabled person about the effect on the
family or intimate friends of the disabled person if a life-sustaining procedure
were provided, withheld, or withdrawn.
Id. § 13-711 (d). This provision in the Estates & Trusts Article is essentially the same as the
section in the Health-General Article that lists the factors to be considered by a surrogate
decisionmaker who is to base his or her decision on the "wishes" of the patient. See MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c) (1994).
In Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993), the Court of Appeals commented
on the "substituted judgment" rule, concluding that an individual entitled to self-determi-
nation who becomes incapable of expressing his opinion is entitled to have the courts
recognize his right to make a decision according to the "substituted judgment" test:
Where court authorization is sought to withdraw from an incompetent per-
son artificially administered sustenance, viewed as a medical treatment, the stan-
dard to apply is determined by the right for which judicial protection is sought.
The right is one of self-determination, but, if the person who enjoys the right is in
a persistent vegetative state, that person cannot make the determination. To pro-
tect the right for incompetent persons, and to permit its exercise, courts apply a
rule of "substituted judgment."
From the standpoint of initiating a request to withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment, the judgment of the guardian or applicant for guardianship is truly substi-
tuted for that of the ward. But, from the standpoint of whether the treatment is
to be withdrawn, the "substituted judgment" label is a misnomer. The judgment
of the guardian is not accepted by the court in lieu of the judgment of the ward.
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her own assessment of the "best interest" of a disabled
person.21
II. THE COURT AS SETTLER OF DISPUTES
A. The Statutory Scheme of the Health Care Decisions Act of 1993
Although the legislative framework of the Health Care Decisions
Act of 1993 is quite encompassing, disputes can be expected to arise
in its interpretation. Therefore, it is important to understand the
Act's legal background, as well as its contents, to understand the
court's role as a settler of these disputes.
Rather, because the right is one of self-determination, the inquiry focuses on
whether the ward had determined, or would determine, that treatment should be
withdrawn under the circumstances of the case.
Id. at 214-15, 618 A.2d at 757.
21. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 13-713 (Supp. 1993). Section 13-711(b) defines
"best interest" and lists the factors that are to be considered:
(1) The effect of the treatment on the physical, emotional, and cognitive
functions of the disabled person;
(2) The degree of physical pain or discomfort caused to the disabled person
by the treatment, or the withholding or withdrawal of the treatment;
(3) The degree to which the disabled person's medical condition, the treat-
ment, or the withholding or withdrawal of treatment, result in a severe and con-
tinuing impairment of the dignity of the disabled person by subjecting the
individual to a condition of extreme humiliation and dependency;
(4) The effect of the treatment on the life expectancy of the disabled person;
(5) The prognosis of the disabled person for recovery, with and without the
treatment;
(6) The risks, side effects, and benefits of the treatment or the withholding
or withdrawal of the treatment; and
(7) The religious beliefs and basic values of the disabled person receiving
treatment, to the extent these may assist the decisionmaker in determining best
interest.
Id. § 13-711(d). This section parallels the provisions of the Health-General Article that
define the term "best interest" as guidance for a surrogate decisionmaker. Cf MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 601(e) (1994). It is clear from a comparison of these two sections
that a guardian who makes a decision according to the "best interest" of the ward is to
consider'the same factors as a surrogate decisionmaker who is not a guardian.
Moreover, the Estates and Trusts Article also permits a court acting as guardian to
withhold or withdraw life sustaining measures in accord with the "best interest" of the
ward:
(a) In general.-If the court is unable to make a substituted judgment under
§ 13-712 of this subtitle, the court may approve a request for the withholding or
withdrawal of a life-sustaining procedure from the disabled person if the court
determines, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, that the withholding
or withdrawal is in the best interest of the disabled person.
(b) Considerations precluded.-The decision of whether life-sustaining proce-
dures should be provided, withheld, or withdrawn shall not be based in whole or
in part, on either a patient's preexisting, long-term mental or physical disability,
or a patient's economic disadvantage.
MD. CODE ANN., Esr. & TRusTs § 13-713(a)-(b) (Supp. 1993).
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1. The Legal Background of the Health Care Decisions Act.-Mary-
land legal history on the issue of consent to medical procedures is
limited but fairly complete. It consists of several elements, including
prior statutes (both state and federal), opinions of the Maryland At-
torney General, and case law from the Maryland courts.22
The Maryland legislature first enacted legislation pertaining to
advance medical directives in 1985.23 That legislation was limited in
scope and included many restrictions that have been removed by the
Health Care Decisions Act of 1993.24 Another statute that made an
important contribution to Maryland's law on patient consent to medi-
cal procedures was the federal Patient Self-Determination Act of
1990,25 which became effective on December 1, 1991. That statute
requires health care institutions to inform patients about their right to
accept or refuse medical treatment. This information is given to com-
petent patients in order to make them aware of their right to make
advance directives and to appoint a health care agent to make health
care decisions in a surrogate capacity should the patient become un-
able to make such decisions.26
Further guidance in this area came from an exhaustive and well-
written opinion by the Maryland Attorney General in 1988.27 This
opinion surveyed the law of informed consent, advance medical direc-
tives, and the right to withhold and withdraw life-sustaining measures.
The courts also have provided guidance on the issue of patient
autonomy and consent in health care decisionmaking. In Sard v.
Hardy,28 the Court of Appeals held that a physician must obtain the
patient's "informed consent" before performing a medical procedure.
The court wrote:
22. Two law review articles also have added to the developing understanding of con-
sent to medical procedures. See Kenneth C. Proctor, Consent to Operative Procedures, 22 MD.
L. REv. 190 (1962) (discussing express and implied consent, ineffective consent, persons
who were authorized to give consent, and the position of minors, all with regard to consent
to operative procedures); Robert E. Powell, Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 MD. L. Rv.
189 (1961) (discussing.express consent, implied consent, restrictions and exhaustion of
consent, the emergency doctrine, and factors such as fraud, coercion, and mistake that
may prevent consent from being effective).
23. 1985 Md. Laws 620.
24. For example, this law did not allow a patient to appoint a surrogate to make bind-
ing medical decisions on his or her behalf. The Health Care Decisions Act permits such an
appointment. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(b) (1994).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a) (1) (F) (Supp. IV 1992).
26. Id.
27. 73 Op. Att'y Gen. 162 (1988).
28. 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977).
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The doctrine of informed consent, which we shall apply
here, follows logically from the universally recognized rule
that a physician, treating a mentally competent adult under
non-emergency circumstances, cannot properly undertake to
perform surgery or administer other therapy without the
prior consent of his patient. In order for the patient's con-
sent to be effective, it must have been an "informed" con-
sent, one that is given after the patient has received a fair
and reasonable explanation of the contemplated treatment
or procedure.
29
The Sard court continued: "By focusing on the patient's need to ob-
tain information pertinent to the proposed surgery or therapy, the
materiality test promotes the paramount purpose of the informed
consent doctrine-to vindicate the patient's right to determine what
shall be done with his own body and when."3" Similarly, in Mercy Hos-
pital v. Jackson,"' the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the patient's
right of autonomy by recognizing the right of a Jehovah's Witness to
assert freedom of religion as the basis for a refusal to accept a blood
transfusion. 2
Most importantly, during the 1993 legislative session, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals decided Mack v. Mack.3 That case involved an
application by a guardian to withdraw artificially-administered nutri-
tion and hydration from an individual who was not terminally ill, but
who was in a persistent vegetative state.3 4 In Mack, the court recog-
nized that an individual who has become incompetent has the right to
have his or her medical care wishes carried out by medical person-
nel.35 For cases in which the intent of the patient cannot be ascer-
tained, however, the Mack court declined to adopt a "best interest
standard" by which others could make decisions for the patient.36 It
29. Id. at 438-39, 379 A.2d at 1019.
30. Id. at 444, 379 A.2d at 1022.
31. 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985).
32. Id. at 418, 489 A.2d at 1134. In 1989, a similar case concerning a petition to with-
hold cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event of cardiac arrest (because of the patient's
stroke-induced physical condition) reached the Court of Appeals. The high court by-
passed the issue as moot, however, because the patient had died before the court could
rule. In re Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496, 500, 506, 564 A.2d 812, 814, 817 (1989).
33. 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
34. Id. at 191, 618 A.2d at 746.
35. Id. at 200-01, 618 A.2d at 750-51.
36. Id. at 198, 618 A.2d at 749. The "best interest" standard is sometimes referred to as
a "reasonable person" or "quality of life" standard.
For an in-depth discussion of Mack, see Karen E. Goldmeier, The Right to Refuse Life-
Sustaining Medical Treatment: Recent Changes in Maryland Law, 53 MD. L. REv. 1306 (1994).
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was against this somewhat involved background that the Maryland leg-
islature crafted the Health Care Decisions Act of 1993.
2. The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993. 3T-The Health Care De-
cisions Act recognizes and protects personal autonomy in health care
decisionmaking in the following ways. First, a competent individual's
written advance medical directive or appointment of a health care
agent for decisionmaking purposes is to be honored if the patient
later becomes incapable of making his or her own decisions.38 The
authority of the health care agent is to be respected to the extent and
"under the circumstances stated in the advance directive."" Second,
a competent individual's oral advance directive that authorizes the
provision, withholding, or withdrawal of a life-sustaining procedure,
or the appointment of a health care agent, also is to be given legal
effect.4
0
Third, the Health Care Decisions Act empowers surrogates to
make medical care decisions for a patient based on a "substituted
judgment" test.4 The Act authorizes individuals (in a specified order
37. The Health Care Decisions Act was initially introduced into the Maryland Senate as
S.B. 646 and underwent substantial modification before emerging in its final form. The
bill was influenced by the Virginia Health Care Decision Act. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2981 to
-2993 (Supp. 1994). As of the writing of this article, there were no annotations to the
Virginia Act helpful to its interpretation. Three law review articles, however, provide valua-
ble insight into the Virginia statute and its background. See Dayna B. Matthew, The "Termi-
nal Condition" in Virginia's Natural Death Act, 73 VA. L. REv. 749-81 (1987) (suggesting that
the ambiguous term "terminal condition" in Virginia's Natural Death Act, enacted in 1983,
had led to narrow court interpretations contrary to the intent of Virginia's General Assem-
bly); Note, Proxy Decisionmaking For the Terminally Il" The Virginia Approach, 70 VA. L. REv.
1269, 1289-1302 (1984) (commenting on the Natural Death Act of Virginia, codified as VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54-1-2981 to -2992 (1991) (amended 1992); Note, The Virginia Natural Death
Act-A Critical Analysis, 17 U. RICH. L. REv. 863 (1983) (discussing the legal history of the
Natural Death Act).
38. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(a)-(b) (1994). The statute contains a
number of suggested forms to serve as guidelines to those making advance medical direc-
tives. Id. § 5-603.
39. Id. § 5-602(b) (1). The Act also provides: "An agent appointed under this subtitle
has decision making priority over any individuals otherwise authorized under this subtitle
to make health care decisions for a declarant." Id. § 5-602(b) (3).
40. Id. § 5-602(d). A properly made advance oral directive has the same effect as a
written advance medical directive "if made in the presence of the attending physician and
one witness and documented as part of the individual's medical record. The documenta-
tion shall be dated and signed by the attending physician and witness." Id.
41. Id. §§ 5-605(a) (2), 5-605(c). The words "substituted judgment" are not used in the
statute. Rather, the statute refers to the "wishes of the patient," probably a more instructive
phrase. Most courts speak of decisions made on a "substituted judgment" basis, generally
meaning "according to the wishes of the patient." See Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d
1263, 1267 (Mass. 1992) (dealing with life-sustaining health care decisionmaking in guardi-
anship cases and applying the term "substituted judgment"). Similarly, the Estates and
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of priority) to make decisions based on their knowledge of what the
patient would want in such a situation.4 2 The legislature has identi-
fied criteria upon which a surrogate may base a "substituted judg-
ment" decision in health care matters. These broad criteria include
factors such as the patient's current diagnosis and prognosis with and
without the treatment at issue, the patient's expressed the patient's
relevant religious and moral beliefs.43
Although the legislature has identified criteria for forming a "sub-
stituted judgment," there is probably leeway for other factors to be
considered. The courts also may have input on this issue. In Mack v.
Mack,44 the Court of Appeals held that
[t]he scope of the evidence that may be received in the in-
quiry is as wide as the concepts of relevance and materiality
are to the state of mind issue. Oral, as well as written, state-
ments of the ward, made prior to the ward's incompetency,
should be considered. Evidence of this character will in-
clude any actual, expressed intent or desire to have artificial
sustenance withdrawn, but the evidence is not limited to spe-
cific, subjective intent evidence. The patient's "'philosophi-
cal, religious and moral views, life goals, values about the
purpose of life and the way it should be lived, and attitudes
toward sickness, medical procedures, suffering and death"'
should be explored.45
Thus, in "substituted judgment" situations, the evidence that can be
used to ascertain the wishes of the disabled patient most likely is lim-
ited only by "relevance and materiality."46
Trusts Article uses the term "substituted judgment" in dealing with life-sustaining health
care decisionmaking in guardianship cases. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-711 (d),
13-712 (Supp. 1993).
42. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a) (2) (1994).
43. Id. § 5-605(c) (2).
44. 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
45. Id. at 215, 618 A.2d at 758 (quoting In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434 (NJ. 1987)).
46. Id. This conclusion is supported by the legislative pronouncement in the Estates
and Trusts Article pertaining to the substituted judgment test, which states:
(c) Admissibility of evidence required.-Evidence of the intentions or wishes of the
disabled person regarding the withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining pro-
cedure that might otherwise be inadmissible may be admitted, in the discretion of
the court, if it is:
(1) Material and probative; and
(2) The best evidence available.
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-712(c) (Supp. 1993).
As the Mack court noted, however, in some cases it is easier to ascertain the wishes of
the patient than in others. Mack, 329 Md. at 216-17, 618 A.2d at 758. The Mack court cited
as an example the case of Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 632
(Mass. 1986), in which the patient, Mr. Brophy, had made his own wishes clear while dis-
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Finally, if the wishes of the patient are not known and cannot be
determined, the Health Care Decisions Act authorizes surrogates (in a
specified order of priority) to make decisions based solely on the "best
interest of the patient."'47 As with a "substituted judgment" decision,
the patient's best interest is to be determined according to a statutory
list of criteria. These criteria include the effect of the treatment on
the physical, emotional, and cognitive functions of the patient; the
degree to which the patient's condition and the contemplated treat-
ment would degrade the individual by subjecting him or her to a con-
dition of extreme humiliation and dependency; the effect of the
treatment on the patient's life expectancy; the prognosis for recovery
with and without the contemplated treatment; the risks and side ef-
fects of the contemplated course of action; and the religious beliefs
and basic values of the patient.48 Unlike a "substituted judgment" sit-
uation, however, the Act's list of factors to be considered in determin-
ing the "best interest" of the patient probably cannot-and should
not-be expanded by court decision. In Mack, the Court of Appeals
was emphatic in stating that both the determination of a disabled pa-
tient's "best interest" and the delineation of factors that go into mak-
ing that determination are to be left to the legislature.
A best interest test applied to Ronald or to any patient
who is in a persistent vegetative state, who is not in pain, and
who is not terminally ill, requires this Court to make a qual-
ity-of-life judgment under judicially adopted standards, with-
out any legislative guidelines. There are many reasons why it
is not appropriate for this Court to do so.
A best interest argument in the subject context presents
a complete shift in the substantive legal justification for a
court's action. Best interest is not based on the patient's
right of self-determination as to whether treatment should
be received or rejected, because the absence of any conclu-
sion as to the patient's judgment on that issue is precedent
to applying the best interest analysis.49
This guidance from the Court of Appeals is important. Abandoning
the anchorage of the patient's right of self-determination sets courts
cussing the case of Karen Ann Quinlan with his wife approximately 10 years prior to the
time when a decision had to be made concerning his own life. Brophy had stated emphati-
cally that he did not want to live on a life-support system. Mack, 329 Md. at 216-17 n.10,
618 A.2d at 758 n.10. Such a statement could serve as the relevant and material evidence
upon which to base a substituted judgment.
47. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-605(a) (2), 5-605(c) (1994).
48. Id. § 5-601(e).
49. Mack, 329 Md. at 218, 619 A.2d at 759.
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adrift on a sea of conflicting values and subjective weighing of those
values. Where the values themselves are in a state of flux in society, a
legislative body is better equipped to determine, within constitutional
limits, whether some lives are or are not worth living, and how to tell
the difference."°
With the strong case law framework of Mack v. Mack and the
equally strong legislative framework of the Health Care Decisions Act,
the picture is clear for a court acting as settler of disputes concerning
health care decisions. A surrogate, acting in accord with "substituted
judgment," or secondarily, acting in accord with the "best interest" of
the patient, has a clear list of the factors that are to be considered in
making crucial health care decisions. The law, however, is not neutral
in this regard. It is biased in favor of life.5' Therefore, unless and
until the wishes of the patient can be determined, a court cannot per-
mit a surrogate to elect to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining meas-
ures,52 even under the Health Care Decisions Act.
B. Is the Act a Limitation on the Patient's Right of Autonomy?
The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 may seem to restrict the
right of autonomy of an incompetent patient because the Act (1) lim-
its the patient to the contents of his or her advance directive if no
decisionmaking agent has been appointed,53 (2) allows a surrogate to
make decisions based on listed criteria,54 and (3) states that no deci-
sion may be made unless the patient suffers from a terminal or end-
state condition, or unless the patient is in a persistent vegetative
state.55
It is doubtful, however, that the Health Care Decisions Act will
limit a patient's right of autonomy. First, the Act is very broad in
scope and seeks to give full effect to the patient's wishes. Second, the
Act probably should be interpreted broadly because the right of au-
tonomy in medical decisionmaking most likely qualifies for constitu-
50. Id. at 219, 618 A.2d at 759-60.
51. Id. at 206 n.5, 618 A.2d at 753 n.5.
52. In fact, by limiting a disabled patient's means of obtaining substituted judgment or
best-interest surrogate decisionmaking to those avenues and criteria approved by the Act,
the Act arguably operates as a limitation on the patient's autonomy. As discussed infra Part
II.B., however, when the Act is viewed as a codification and extension of the existing case
law structure, it can be interpreted more properly as encouraging the clear expression of
the patient's wishes and the consideration of all proper and relevant evidence of those
wishes.
53. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(b) (Supp. 1994).
54. Id. § 5-605.
55. Id. § 5-606. This section of the Act sets forth physician certification requirements
that differ based on the patient's condition. Id.
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tional protection. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,56
the Supreme Court emphasized that there is a constitutional liberty
interest associated with the right to refuse life saving procedures.57
Similarly, the Mack court stated unequivocally that "parties who are
unable to exercise the right to refuse treatment themselves, neverthe-
less still enjoy the right" to have treatment withheld in recognition of
their exercise of autonomy.58 The Maryland Court of Appeals held
that the right to refuse treatment is a basic common law right of the
patient "to exercise control over his own body . . .by deciding for
himself whether or not to submit to the particular therapy. . . . A
corollary to the doctrine is the patient's right, in general, to refuse
treatment and to withdraw consent to treatment once begun."59
56. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
57. Id. at 278, 281. The Maryland Court of Appeals reiterated this view in Mack. The
Mack majority noted that "all of the justices, save Justice Scalia, either flatly stated or
strongly implied that a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment gives rise to a
constitutionally protected right to refuse life saving hydration and nutrition." Mack, 329
Md. at 211, 618 A.2d at 755-56; see also Thomas Wm. Mayo, Contitutionalizing the "Right to
Die,"49 MD. L. REv. 103 (1990).
58. Mack, 329 Md. at 211-12, 618 A.2d at 756. The Mack court also cited many other
cases in support of this proposition, including In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 267 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 568 So. 2d 4 (1990); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc.,
497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419, 423 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981). The Mack court also cited an extensive opinion by Maryland's Attorney General,
73 Op. Att'y Gen. 162, 175-78 (1988).
59. Mack, 329 Md. at 210, 618 A-2d at 755. A good summary of the historical develop-
ment of the doctrine of self-determination is found in In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis.
1992):
In 1891, the United States Supreme Court stated unequivocally that individu-
als have a right to self-determination: "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S. CL 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891). Judge
Cardozo expanded this notion to create the doctrine of informed consent:
"Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation with-
out his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages."
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospita4 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is the right not
to consent-the right to refuse treatment. Numerous courts have grounded the
right to refuse treatment in whole or in part on the common law right to self
determination and informed consent. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State
Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858, 102 S. Ct. 309, 70
L.Ed.2d 153 (1981); In re Conroy, 98 NJ.321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
Id. at 65; see also In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (discussing the right of a surrogate
to refuse life-sustaining treatment for an incompetent patient); Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 628-32 (Mass. 1986) (recognizing evidence of a patient's
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Therefore, it is correct, at least as a basic common law right and
most probably as a constitutional right as well, to state that a person
who is now incapable of making a decision to accept or refuse treat-
ment still has a right to have the law carry out the health care decision
that he or she made while competent. The patient's right of auton-
omy is not absolute, however. "It is subject to 'at least four counter-
vailing State interests: (1) the preservation of life; (2) the protection
of interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of suicide;
and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profes-
sion."'" Nonetheless, although the state can require that proof of the
patient's wishes be proved by clear and convincing evidence before it
allows a surrogate to act for the patient in withdrawing or withholding
life-supporting measures,6' the state's interests pale in comparison to
the basic right of the individual to autonomy in medical care
decisionmaking.6
2
Overall, when the Health Care Decisions Act is read together with
the broad pronouncements in Mack, it is clear that the patient's right
to self-determination is paramount and that the courts generally
should respect and enforce advance directives when acting in their
role as settlers of disputes. Even in cases in which an attending medi-
cal practitioner may be reluctant to accept a medical directive docu-
ment-for example, one that is technically flawed because it contains
only one witness signature instead of two 63 -a trial court would most
wishes to refuse life-sustaining treatment); In reJobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987) (hold-
ing that "the fateful decision to withdraw life-supporting treatment is extremely per-
sonal."); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 450 (Wash. 1987) (discussing the right of incompetent
patients to refuse life-sustaining treatment); Kristine C. Karnezis, Annotation, Patient's
Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessayy to Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R.3D 67 (1978).
60. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 210 n.7, 618 A.2d 744, 755 n.7 (1993) (quoting Brophy
v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d, 626, 634 (Mass. 1986)).
61. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 271 (1990); Mack, 329 Md. at
215-16, 618 A.2d at 758.
62. In In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1992), the court addressed the preeminence of
the patient's interests:
[T] his [state interest] weakens as the degree of bodily intrusion increases and the
chance of recovery wanes. At a certain point, treatment serves only to prolong
the dying process unnaturally, and at this point the patient's liberty interest in
refusing treatment prevails. An unqualified state interest in preserving life irre-
spective of either a patient's express wishes or of the patient's best interests trans-
forms human beings into unwilling prisoners of medical technology.
Id. at 74 (citations omitted). Similarly, in Thor v. Superior Court, 855 P.2d 375 (Cal.
1993), the California Supreme Court gave only minimal consideration to the state's inter-
ests: "It is antithetical to our scheme of ordered liberty and to our self respect for the
autonomy of the individual for the State to make decisions regarding the individual's qual-
ity of life." Id. at 383, 385.
63. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-602(c)(1) (1994).
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probably give it legal effect. Therefore, in practice, the Health Care
Decisions Act should not limit a patient's right of autonomy.
C. Some Other Issues
The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 was enacted after much
debate and thought and with awareness of other state legislative
schemes and after the analysis of many appellate court decisions
throughout the United States. Hopefully, the Act will fulfill its pur-
pose of protecting patients by minimizing disputes over their treat-
ment. Experience, however, dictates that disputes are inevitable.
Below is a discussion of some, but certainly not all, of the potential
areas of dispute that may arise under the Act.
1. Competency.--Competent individuals, of course, can make
their own health care decisions. Actions are taken pursuant to an ad-
vance medical directive or through a surrogate decisionmaking pro-
cess only when an individual is or has become incapable of making an
informed decision.64 Therefore, it is inevitable that disputes will arise
concerning the patient's competence to make decisions. Questions of
competence arise in several different contexts: whether the patient
was competent when the advance directive was written, when the
agent was appointed, or when the verbal directive was given; whether
the patient is "incapable" today to make his or her own decision; and
whether the advance directive or surrogate's decision will control.
Most judges will agree, however, that these questions are rarely that
troublesome and are often rather routine.65
Furthermore, the Act provides some guidance for determining
when the patient is incompetent. The Health Care Decisions Act de-
fines the term "incapable of making an informed decision" as
64. Id. §§ 5-602(e), 5-606.
65. In Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., TheJudicial Role in Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment
Decisions, 7 IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 53 (1991) the authors point out that, from a summary of
responses to inquiries from trial judges, three issues predominate in this area of court
decisionmaking: (1) patient competency, (2) appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker,
and (3) resolution of the ultimate issue of foregoing life sustaining medical treatment. Id.
at 53-54. Similarly, the American Hospital Association asserted in its amicus curiae brief in
the Cruzan case that, of the 1,300,000 people who die in American hospitals each year, 70%
die after a decision is made to forego life-sustaining medical treatment. Id. at 63 n.19
(citing Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Hospital Association at 3, Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). According to the article, there were fewer than
100 published judicial opinions between 1970 and 1989 on the subject of the withdrawal or
withholding of life-sustaining measures following patient incompetence. Id. The results of
the survey were based on responses from 2357 then-current state trial judges who had held
hearings in at least one case. Id.
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the inability of an adult patient to make an informed deci-
sion about the provision, withholding, or withdrawal of a spe-
cific medical treatment or course of treatment because the
patient is unable to understand the nature, extent, or prob-
able consequences of the proposed treatment or course of
treatment, is unable to make a rational evaluation of the bur-
dens, risks, and benefits of the treatment or course of treat-
ment, or is unable to communicate a decision.66
Incapacity also can take different forms. An individual may be suffi-
ciently disabled as to be unable to manage his or her property or per-
son generally, but still be able to make health care decisions. The Act
requires that a physician certify that an individual is incapable of mak-
ing health care decisions before the advance directive becomes
effective.67
It is important, moreover, to understand the difference between
the statutory threshold of incapacity-as a condition precedent to sur-
rogate health care decisionmaking-and the threshold of incapacity
for appointing a guardian of the person. Judges and attorneys who
deal with guardianship matters are aware that there are occasions
when an individual is incapable of managing his or her property or
person, but still sufficiently competent to make a will disposing of his
or her property.68 Indeed, the threshold degree of "inability to func-
tion" that warrants the appointment of a guardian normally is lower
than the threshold of inability for being declared "incapable of mak-
ing an informed decision."69 The latter, higher threshold must be
66. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(o)(1) (1994).
67. Id. § 5-606 (containing the statutory provisions setting forth the requirements for
medical certification of incapacity and the condition of a patient). The medical certifica-
tion requirements may differ depending upon the condition of the patient and the type of
treatment being contemplated. Id.
68. For a guardianship to be established on the basis of physical or mental disability,
the Estates and Trusts Article requires a showing that the patient is unable to "provide for
his daily needs sufficiently to protect his health or safety." MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS
§ 13-101 (d) (2) (i) (1991). That Article sets forth separate grounds upon which a guardian
of the person may be appointed:
A guardian of the person shall be appointed if the court determines from clear
and convincing evidence that a person lacks sufficient understanding or capacity
to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person, including
provisions for health care, food, clothing, or shelter, because of any mental disa-
bility, senility, other mental weakness, disease, habitual drunkenness, or addiction
to drugs, and that no less restrictive form of intervention is available which is
consistent with the person's welfare and safety.
Id. § 13-705(b).
69. In Miller v. Rhode Island Hosp., 625 A.2d 778 (R.I. 1993), the court stated that "the
trial justice's presumption that a patient must be legally incompetent or of unsound mind
in order for a hospital to dispose of the informed-consent requirement is too broad." Id. at
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reached before an advanced directive, appointment of a health care
agent, or surrogate decisionmaking may become operative to govern
health care decisionmaking.7 ° As a practical matter, courts are most
careful to recognize that an individual's right of autonomy (in will-
making, health care decisionmaking, and otherwise) very often exists
even though he or she is a ward of the court.
2. The Surrogate Priority Position. -Individuals eligible to act as
surrogates for a patient are listed, in order of priority, in the Health
Care Decisions Act:
The following individuals or groups, in the specified or-
der of priority, may make decisions about health care for a
person who has been certified to be incapable of making an
informed decision and who has not appointed a health care
agent in accordance with this subtitle. Individuals in a par-
ticular class may be consulted to make a decision only if all
individuals in the next higher class are unavailable
(i) A guardian for the patient, if one has been
appointed;
(ii) The patient's spouse;
(iii) An adult child of the patient;
(iv) A parent of the patient;
(v) An adult brother or sister of the patient; or
(vi) A friend or other relative of the patient who meets
the requirements of [the following paragraph] of this
subsection.71
Disputes may arise from this statutory prioritization when a person
who would be appointed as surrogate under the Act holds a position
that is at odds with the wishes or best interests of the patient or with
another potential surrogate of equal priority.7 It is unclear whether
785. The court also observed that "the capacity to make medical decisions need not be
synonymous with one's sanity or legal capacity." Id. The mental capacity to make a deci-
sion is to be evaluated "according to particular circumstances involved rather than [being
derived] from a general presumption." Id. (citations omitted). The question of a patient's
competence to consent to a medical procedure is thus one of fact. Id.
70. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-606 (1994).
71. Id. § 5-605(a) (2) (1994). At the lowest level of priority, the "friend or other rela-
tive," there is an additional requirement that the potential surrogate present an affidavit to
the attending physician attesting to his or her qualifications to serve as a surrogate. The
affidavit must set forth specific facts and circumstances demonstrating, inter alia, that the
person has maintained regular contact with the patient sufficient to be familiar with the
patient's activities, health, and personal beliefs. Id. § 5-605(a) (3).
72. Id. § 5-605(b) (addressing the problem of conflicts between persons with equal
decisionmaking authority).
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courts have discretion to change the statutory priority in selecting a
surrogate. The statute, however, should not be interpreted to allow a
surrogate to make a decision that is contrary to the wishes of the pa-
tient or that is against the patient's best interest merely because that
surrogate has a higher priority under the Act than another individual.
The answer to this question of surrogate priority probably lies in
the Mack decision."' In the guardianship context of the Estates and
Trusts Article, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated in Mack that the
order of preference in the appointment of a guardian is always subject
to the court's overriding concern for the best interest of the ward and
that the decision of whom to appoint must ultimately lie in the discre-
tion of the trial judge. Moreover, the Health Care Decisions Act
provides, above everything else, that a decision is to be made first on
the basis of "the wishes of the patient and, if the wishes of the patient
are unknown or unclear, on the patient's best interest."75
Future litigation concerning the prioritization of surrogates
under the Health Care Decisions Act probably will result in a holding
similar to that reached in Mack. That is, while the statutory priorities
must not be lightly overlooked, they may be adjusted, in the discretion
of the court, when necessary to assure that the patient's wishes and
best interest are given legal effect.
3. The Best Interest Test.-In the 1993 Act, the Maryland legisla-
ture decided to allow a surrogate to act according to a "best interest"
test,7 6 under which the "best interest" of the patient is to be deter-
mined upon consideration of factors enumerated in the statute.77
The statutory list of criteria is crucial to resolving disputes in this area,
especially in light of the Court of Appeals' decision to shun ajudicial
definition of the "best interest" test.78
73. 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
74. Id at 203, 618 A.2d at 752 (citations omitted). In Mack, the Court of Appeals re-
manded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the wife of the disabled
person, who had a higher statutory priority under the Estates and Trusts Article than the
disabled person's father, was properly bypassed in favor of the father. Id. at 206, 618 A.2d
at 753.
75. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(c) (1994).
76. Id.
77. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. The factors listed in the Health-Gen-
eral Article are similar to the factors described in the Estates and Trusts Article concerning
guardianship matters. See supra note 21 (suggesting a comparison between MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 601(e) (1994) and MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 13-711(b)
(Supp. 1993)).
78. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 222, 618 A.2d 744, 761 (1993) (stating that a definition
of the best interest test was best left to the legislature). Two judges dissented, however,
stating that the articulation of a best interest test was an appropriate step for the court to
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The statute leaves certain questions unanswered, however. No-
ticeably missing from the legislature's list of "best interest" factors are
considerations of the financial impact of a contemplated treatment
program and the burden it could impose on society's limited re-
sources.79 These considerations are important. With our society's re-
source limitations, remedial measures such as rationing of health care
already are being discussed. 0 If health care rationing were to occur
by statute, it could lead to a situation in which courts give interpreta-
tions, frame quality of life structures, and set standards that may be in
conflict with the ethical views of the medical profession. It may be
wise to consider factors such as financial impact in determining the
patient's best interest.
Moreover, there are other statutes that may affect and complicate
the determination of a patient's best interest. For example, in In re
Baby K,"1 a disagreement arose between parents concerning whether
medical treatment should be continued for an encephalic infant. At-
torneys argued that withholding the ventilator from the child would
violate the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act,82 the
take. Id. at 223, 618 A.2d at 762 (McAuliffe,J., and Murphy, CJ., dissenting). The dissent-
ers wrote that the substituted judgment standard should ensure, as much as possible, that a
surrogate decisionmaker reach the decision the incompetent patient would make if he or
she were competent. Id. (citations omitted). The dissenters posed a hypothetical question:
The question we thereby attempt to answer may be stated in this hypothetical
form: If Ronald Mack, complete with his personality, predilections, philosophies,
beliefs, and values were given competency for a day, and fully informed concern-
ing what had transpired, the condition and environment to which he would
shortly and permanently return, the beliefs and desires of his family members,
and the prognosis in this case, what decision would he make concerning the dis-
continuance of artificially administered nutrition and hydration?
Id. at 225-26, 618 A.2d at 763. The dissenters, arguing for a court-defined "best interest"
test, answered their own question: "Given these facts alone, I believe most reasonable per-
sons would elect to terminate this existence." Id. at 227, 618 A.2d at 763-64.
79. In Mack, the court recognized, but did not act on, these concerns:
The best interest, i.e., reasonable person, standard that [the patient's spouse]
seeks enlarges the concept of best interest beyond the needs of the ward to in-
clude consideration of the emotional and financial impact on, and desires of, [the
patient's] family and of the burden on the limited resources of society. But we are
by no means confident that there exists on this quality-of-life question the degree
of societal consensus that this Court ordinarily requires before announcing a
change in the common law.
Id. at 219-20, 618 A.2d at 760.
80. Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for Physicians be Changed to
Accommodate New Models for Rationing Health Care?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1809 (1992). This
article is part of a symposium, "The Law and Policy of Health Care Rationing: Models and
Accountability," that includes articles on models, consumer expectations, and insurance
and political accountability problems.
81. 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988).
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973,83 the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990,84 the Child Abuse Act, as amended in 1984,85 and the Virginia
Medical Malpractice Act.86 The Baby K court ruled that withdrawal of
the ventilator would violate the .Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act.8 7 The court declined to express an opinion on the other
two statutes.88 Consequently, in some situations, the "best interest" of
a patient may have less to do with the legislature's enumerated factors
in health care decisionmaking than with other extralegal or extrajudi-
cial factors, or even with other applicable federal or state statutes.
4. Medically Ineffective Treatment.-By providing that a physician
is not required to prescribe or render medical treatment that is ethi-
cally inappropriate, 9 the Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 addresses
an area of frequent ethical controversy: "medically ineffective" treat-
ment.9" The Act defines "medically ineffective treatment" as treat-
ment or procedures "that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
... will not: (1) Prevent or reduce the deterioration of the health of
an individual; or (2) Prevent the impending death of an individual."91
This part of the Act does not provide carte blanche authorization for
the physician to proceed on his or her own or to force medical treat-
ment to be provided, withheld, or withdrawn. Although physicians
have professional responsibilities to themselves and to their profes-
sion-and are not required to render ethically inappropriate treat-
ment-they are subjected to some limitations.
First, the Act states:
[A] patient's attending physician may withhold or withdraw
as medically ineffective a treatment that under generally ac-
83. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (Supp. IV 1992).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5105-5107 (1988).
86. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to -581.20 (Michie 1992).
87. In re Baby K., 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (E.D. Va. 1993).
88. Id.
89. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(a) (1994).
90. Id. § 5-611 (i). The controversial nature of "medically futile" treatment has often
been addressed. See, e.g., AllenJ. Bennett, When Is Medical Treatment "Futile"?, 9 IssuES IN L.
& MED. 35 (1993) (discussing statutory parameters and limitations, examples of some futil-
ity issues, definitions of futility, and physician, patient, and societal concerns); Robert M.
Veatch & Carol M. Spicer, Medically Futile Care The Role of the Physician in Setting Limits, 18
AM.J.L. & MED. 15, 16, 35 (1992) (stating that, if the clinician believes that an incompetent
patient is "being harmed seriously by futile care that is demanded by a surrogate, the clini-
cian has a duty to try to get the surrogate's decision overridden. It is not the clinician's
duty to override [the surrogate's decision] on his or her own .. .
91. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(n) (1994).
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cepted medical practices is life-sustaining in nature only if
the patient's attending physician and a second physician cer-
tify in writing that the treatment is medically ineffective and
the attending physician informs the patient or the patient's
agent or surrogate of the physician's decision.92
Second, when a physician determines that a patient's wishes or best
interests run counter to what the physician feels is appropriate-for
example, when the physician concludes that the contemplated treat-
ment is medically futile-the physician cannot simply abandon the pa-
tient. There is no requirement that the physician continue to treat
that patient, but the Health Care Decisions Act mandates that the phy-
sician give notice of his or her intent not to comply with the patient's
wishes.93 The physician must assist in the transfer of the patient to
another health care provider and must maintain the patient's life un-
til the transfer is made.94 Third, the Act prohibits the physician from
involvement in mercy killing or euthanasia.95 Thus, both in the area
of medically ineffective treatment determinations and in the realm of
physician ethics, the Act provides some guidance but still presents the
possibility of dispute.
5. Health Care Provider Court Action.--The Health Care Decisions
Act gives a health care provider the right, and in some cases the re-
sponsibility, to take action when he or she believes that a surrogate is
acting in a manner that is "inconsistent with generally accepted stan-
dards of patient care." 96 In such a case, if the patient is in a hospital
or related institution, the health care provider "shall" petition the pa-
tient care advisory committee for advice concerning the withholding
or withdrawal of the life-sustaining procedure.97 If the patient is not
hospitalized, the health care provider "shall" seek a court injunction
or other relief relating to the life-sustaining procedure.98
The legislature sought to encourage maximum health care pro-
vider action by using the word "shall" to describe the physician's legal
responsibilities in this area, but the legislature also imposed some lim-
itations on this avenue of action. First, the Act directs a reviewing
92. Id. § 5-611 (a)(2)(i). The following section adds, "If the patient is being treated in
the emergency department of a hospital and only one physician is available the certifica-
tion of a second physician is not required." Id. § 5-611(a) (2) (ii).
93. Id. § 5-613(a)(1)(i).
94. Id. § 5-613(a)(2), (3).
95. Id. § 5-611 (c).
96. Id. § 5-612.
97. Id. § 5-612(a)(i).
98. Id. § 5-612(a) (ii).
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court to follow the provisions of the guardianship laws in reviewing
surrogate decisionmaking according to the "substituted judgment" or
"best interest" standard.99 Second, the Health Care Decisions Act per-
mits a court to enjoin the health care provider's action "upon finding
by a preponderance of the evidence that the action is not lawfully au-
thorized by this subtitle or by other State or federal law."100
Overall, this section of the Act should not generate much court
involvement. Most people will do the "right" thing most of the time.
Even so, the legislature has given the patient an important safeguard
by allowing the physician to bring a health care provider court action
in a proper case. Moreover, with strong pronouncements in the Act
and in Mack v. Mack1"' that an individual's interest in autonomy will
prevail over the interests of the state and the personal opinions of
others,10 physicians probably will reserve their input for those situa-
tions in which it most properly should be given.
6. The Competence of Minors.-The Health Care Decisions Act ad-
dresses the capacity of minors to make reasoned choices regarding the
provision, withholding, or withdrawal of medical treatment. The Act
defines a competent individual as "a person who is at least 18 years of
age or who under § 20-102(a) of this article has the same capacity as
an adult to consent to medical treatment and who has not been deter-
mined to be incapable of making an informed decision."10' This view
of minors' competency is consistent with other pronouncements of
the law.
99. Section 5-612(a)(2) of the Health-General Article refers to sections 13-711 to 13-
713 of the Estates and Trusts Article, which define "best interest," "life-sustaining proce-
dure," and "substituted judgment," and discuss the applicability of the "best interest" stan-
dard when a substituted judgment is impossible).
100. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-612(b) (1994). Moreover, the Act provides an
expedited procedure for this type of action. Id. § 5-612(c).
101. 329 Md. 188, 618 A.2d 744 (1993).
102. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
103. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601 (f) (1994). The Health-General Article pro-
vides, in § 20-102(a), that minors may give informed consent under the following
circumstances:
(a) Minor who is married orparent-A minor has the same capacity as an adult
to consent to medical treatment if the minor:
(1) Is married; or
(2) Is the parent of a child.
(b) Emergency treatment-A minor has the same capacity as an adult to con-
sent to medical treatment if, in the judgment of the attending physician, the life
or health of the minor would be affected adversely by delaying treatment to ob-
tain the consent of another individual.
Id. § 20-102(a).
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The Act, however, does not go far enough in recognizing that
some minors have sufficient capacity to make health care decisions.
The Supreme Court recognized in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth °4 that minors must be permitted to bypass parental
consent requirements in order to obtain abortions independently if a
court finds that a minor is capable of mature decisionmaking 0 5 Sim-
ilarly, some minors have sufficient capacity to make decisions regard-
ing life and death, including whether to provide, withhold, or
withdraw life-sustaining measures. Respect for a minor's decision is
most important when the responsible adult fails to act in the best in-
terests of the child.106 In sum, the Act's failure to recognize that some
minors' have the capacity for mature decisionmaking in health care
matters will raise problems that the courts will be called upon to
resolve.
7. Suicide. -Although physician-assisted suicide is at the fore-
front of public attention with the activities of Dr. Jack Kevorkian in
Michigan, the Health Care Decisions Act makes it clear that suicide,
euthanasia, and mercy killing are not authorized. 107 The Act states:
"Nothing in this subtitle may be construed to condone, authorize, or
approve mercy killing or euthanasia, or to permit any affirmative or
deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural
process of dying."' 08 The Act does not affirmatively state that suicide
and mercy killing are illegal or criminal, but the Attorney General of
Maryland has interpreted this section of the Act as expressly prohibit-
ing active euthanasia or assisted suicide.' 09
8. Clear and Convincing Evidence.-The Health Care Decisions
Act reflects a broadening of individual rights of autonomy in medical
decisionmaking, but the state retains interests in this area as well.
Thus, the state may constitutionally require that proof of the "critical
facts" in cases involving the withholding or withdrawal of life-sus-
104. 428 U.S. 51 (1976).
105. Id. at 74-75. In that case, the Supreme Court held invalid a blanket parental con-
sent requirement for unmarried women under 18 years of age.
106. See Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Informed Consent for Mental
Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 695 (1993) (arguing that health care profession-
als do not act in the best interest of the child in cases involving certain types of treatment
and suggesting definitions and standards for recognizing children's competency).
107. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611(c) (1994).
108. Id.
109. See 78 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-036 (Sept. 8, 1993).
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taining medical treatment be made by clear and convincing
evidence.11 °
Maryland's Court of Appeals has expressly rejected a lesser stan-
dard of proof for these cases.' Similarly, a 1990 opinion of Mary-
land's Attorney General' 2 presented a well-reasoned statement
concerning the nature of "clear and convincing" evidence:
The Court of Appeals has characterized the clear and
convincing evidence test in comparative terms: more than a
preponderance of the evidence and less than evidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 319-
20, 413 A.2d 170 (1980). More descriptively, Maryland Civil
Pattern Jury Instruction 1:8(b) (2d ed. 1984) states that "[t]o
be clear and convincing, evidence should be 'clear' in the
sense that it is certain, plain to the understanding, and un-
ambiguous and 'convincing' in the sense that it is so reason-
able and persuasive as to cause you to believe it."
Applied to the question of substituted judgment when a
decision about life-sustaining treatment must be made, this
standard calls for a careful assessment of the quality of the
evidence. "The probative value of prior statements will vary,
depending on the age and maturity of the incompetent pa-
tient, the context of the statements, and the connection of
the statements to the debilitating event." In re Grant, 109
Wash. 2d 945, 747 P.2d 445, 457 (1987).
The clear and convincing evidence standard seeks to as-
sure that a decision will not be made if "'the evidence is
loose, equivocal or contradictory'...." In re Storar and
110. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
111. Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, 208, 618 A.2d 744, 754 (1993). The court wrote:
Deanna [Mack, the wife of Ronald, the disabled] vigorously argues that the
playing field should not, in all cases, be tilted in favor of "life" and against
"death," recognizing that "it]his grim dichotomy seems to leave little room for
debate on the issue." Appellant's Brief at 35. Deanna argues that the "issue is
whether [Ronald] will have a vegetative existence for the next three or four de-
cades helplessly dependent on others, without any pleasure.... Thus, the quality
of his very existence is at stake." Id. at 36. Deanna "submits that this grim, de-
grading result cannot be one that public policy, however defined, can be deemed
to favor," so that "this court should not enhance it by adopting an unusual stan-
dard of proof."
Deanna's argument, in essence, would have the standard of proof vary, based
on the quality of life of the patient. Whether a court, in the absence of legislative
guidelines, should undertake to evaluate the quality of the ward's life is a question
which we answer, in the negative ....
Id. at 209, 618 A.2d at 755. The overwhelming majority of appellate cases around the
country have reached the same conclusion. See id. at 208, 209, 618 A.2d at 754-55 (listing
such cases).
112. 75 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-44 (Sept. 24, 1990).
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Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 379, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72 (1981). As the
New Jersey Supreme Court wrote, "an offhand remark about
not wanting to live under certain circumstances made by a
person when young and in the peak of health would not in
itself constitute clear proof twenty years later that he would
want life-sustaining treatment withheld under those circum-
stances." In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230
(1985).
On the other hand, the clear and convincing evidence
standard can be satisfied through testimony that a mature
person had thought about the issue of life-sustaining treat-
ment and had expressed his or her desires "forcefully and
without wavering," corroborated by testimony that the deci-
sion to forego treatment reflected that person's values."1 3
Thus, all authorities agree that the clear and convincing standard of
proof is applicable to cases arising under the Health Care Decisions
Act of 1993.
CONCLUSION
The Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 has answered many ques-
tions and has given much-needed direction regarding the patient's
right of autonomy in health care decisionmaking. All individuals, in-
cluding wards of the court, may make binding advance medical direc-
tives, appoint agents to carry out their wishes, and have family and
friends act in accord with those wishes-or, alternatively, in accord
with their best interest. Although the law makes clear that it is biased
in favor of life, it also states that, above all else, the autonomy of the
individual is to be preserved. Future choices in medical care will be
influenced by advances in medical science and possibly by health care
rationing. It, therefore, was important for both the Maryland legisla-
ture and the Maryland Court of Appeals to provide clear guidelines
concerning when to provide, withhold, or withdraw life-sustaining
medical procedures. Although disputes will inevitably arise, the
Health Care Decisions Act of 1993 and the Court of Appeals's deci-
sion in Mack v. Mack will help keep life and death medical decisions
out of the courtrooms and will allow more of these decisions to re-
main with the individual patient and his family and friends, where
they belong.
113. Id. at 43-44.
